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ABSTRACT
The paper proposes a critical1 approach to information systems definition,
design, and development (ISD) grounded in discourse theory, semiotics,
practical philosophy and critical systems thinking. It aims to support IS
researchers and practitioners in the difficult process of identifying and
scrutinizing the diverse issues they face in any ISD project. Two main
components of the approach are a hierarchic arrangement of these issues, and of
the basic kinds of validity claims they imply, in the form of a philosophical
staircase; and a practical framework for critical discourse on these claims called
critically systemic discourse. The present first part introduces the staircase and
discusses the relevance of the discursive principle for dealing with the various
validity claims raised by each one of its steps. The second part will present a
discursive framework for applying the staircase.

1

The word critical is unfortunately ambivalent in English. In this paper, I use it in the philosophical sense
of “critique” or “critical reflection” (on validity claims) rather than in the engineering sense of a “critical
factor” (of success or failure). Critique means a systematic effort of uncovering the presuppositions and
implications of claims (e.g., in the present context, claims to providing adequate information, valid
knowledge, or recommendations for rational action) rather than criticism in the everyday sense of taking an
adverse attitude. Thus, the phrase “a critical approach to ISD” intends an approach that provides support for
reflecting systematically on the claims raised by a concrete systems definition or design, and on the
implications they may have (if accepted) for all concerned parties.
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INTRODUCTION

In search of clear language and
philosophy. We tend to talk of “information”
and “knowledge” as if we knew what they are.
We conceive of them like of objects that we
can store, process and retrieve in material
form. Some three hundred years ago
researchers in chemistry were using the
“phlogiston” concept in a similar way to refer
to an imaginary element that supposedly was
lost in the process of combustion. During more
then hundred years the phlogiston theory
caused chemists a lot of troubles, which could
be overcome only when Lavoisier replaced it
by the oxidation theory of combustion.
Perhaps information system designers are in a
similar situation today. Perhaps it is time to
start conceiving of information and knowledge
(like of combustion) in terms of processes
rather than objects; we do not “have”
information and knowledge but “we inform”
and “we know,” concepts that imply active
subjects who interact and share what they
think they know with others (Nissen 1992 and
2001). In this paper, I want to show that in the
development and use of information systems
we might indeed do well to conceive of
information and knowledge as ongoing
judgmental and argumentative processes, and
that in order to understand their meaning and
validity, as well as their relevance for rational
action, we need the discursive principle – the
idea that the meaning, relevance, and validity
of information and knowledge can be
established only through discourse.
In current practice, things look rather
different. ISD usually attempts to objectify and
nail down “information” and “knowledge” in
the form of data and inference rules that can
be stored and manipulated by computers. It is
true, though, that the field of IT/IS moved long
ago from its original data-processing (EDP)
language to the language of information
systems definition, design, and development
(ISD). This indicates at least a progress of
intentions, if not of actual achievement. By
“information,” IS designers and users
obviously mean something more than “data”;
otherwise the change of language would be
pointless. I assume this “more” alludes to the
meaning and relevance that the provided data
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should have for the intended users: when
“data” acquires context-dependent meaning
and relevance, it becomes information.
Furthermore, we obviously expect information
to represent valid knowledge on which users
can rely for rational action. Unfortunately, it is
less obvious how exactly the steps from data to
information and on to knowledge and rational
action can be accomplished (or at least
supported) by ISD. The “information”
language of ISD seems at the same time too
ambitious and too narrow: too ambitious in
that technically as well as philosophically
speaking, it is far from clear how arrangements
for systematic data provision by means of IT –
“information systems” – can produce
information as distinguished from data; too
narrow in that what we really expect a good
information system to accomplish is to provide
users with knowledge for rational action.
One should certainly not overemphasize
terminological questions. Ideas and intentions
matter more than the labels we attach to them.
However, inaccurate language is such a
widespread phenomenon in ISD that it can
hardly be accidental. Rather, I suspect, it
betrays a certain lack of philosophical clarity
with respect to the field’s core concepts and
intentions.
The idea of a philosophical staircase
for ISD. If it is not entirely mistaken that the
present state of the field suffers from a
widespread lack of clarity concerning its core
concepts, it seems vital to clarify and
strengthen the philosophical foundations of
ISD. My idea in this paper is to introduce what
I suggest to call a philosophical staircase of
ISD, that is, a series of conceptual steps that
lead us from the prevailing, philosophically
impoverished concept of “information theory”
to a more adequate philosophy of ISD. The
philosophical staircase is a conceptual
framework that arranges basic philosophical
issues of ISD in a flight of stairs that can be
taken step by step, although each consecutive
step depends on all the previous ones. There
are nine such steps in the framework, arranged
in three groups of three steps each. The third
step of each group can be understood as a kind
of half-landing on the way up the stairs where
we can rest and reflect on what we have
achieved so far (Figure 1).
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“Rational action”
“Knowledge”
“Information”

Figure 1: Three major half-landings in the philosophical staircase of ISD
The underlying definition of ISD is
this: ISD is systems definition, design, and
development with a view to providing
people with information for purposeful
action. The implicit idea is that the value of
“information” consists in contributing to
knowledge for purposeful action, and that
the value of “knowledge” in turn consists in
guiding people toward rational action in the
sense of helping actors to choose courses of
action with reason. This basic definition is

still unclear as the three key terms are in obvious
need of philosophical clarification. Our
philosophical staircase thus requires us to relate
ISD to three basic philosophical questions:
•

What do we mean by information?

•

How does information become knowledge?

•

How does knowledge relate to rational
action?

(See Table 1)

Table 1: Three core philosophical problems posed by information systems design
Core concept

Basic issue

Basic theory

“Information”

The philosophical step from
symbolic systems to
“information”
How do we know that some signal
or message (a stream of signs or
symbols) represents information?

Semiotics: the theory of signs
and symbols
≠ “information theory”

“Knowledge”

The philosophical step from
information to “knowledge”
How do we know that some
information represents valid and
relevant knowledge?

Epistemology: the theory of
knowledge
≠ “science theory”

“Rational” action

The philosophical step from
knowledge to “rational” action
How do we know that the
knowledge we rely on is conducive
to rational action?

Practical philosophy: the
theory of rational action
≠ “applied science”

I will discuss each core concept in
terms of three elementary philosophical
conditions, so that in the end our conceptual
staircase will consist of nine conceptual steps
that lead us from computer-processed data to
rational action (Figure 2).

The discursive principle. A second
basic idea of the paper is that in order to take
these conceptual steps, we need a
methodological tool that can help us to climb
the stairs both in the theory and in the practice
of ISD; I mean the principle of discourse.
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Figure 2: The philosophical staircase of ISD
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Discourse as I understand it here is not just the
idea that people involved in ISD should “talk
together” (of course they should); rather, it is
an argumentative method of clarifying
disputed validity claims such as “this is a
meaningful interpretation of the data” or “this
information agrees with the facts.” I propose
that discourse in this sense is constitutive of
what we mean by “information,” “knowledge,”
and “rationality,” insofar as each of these
concepts entails different types of validity
claims that can always be disputed on good
grounds. Note that insofar as information gets
objectified in information systems, discourses
get frozen in objectified form too. This is the
exact contrary of what the discursive principle
intends.
Discourse can help us take the
philosophical steps that lead from data to
information, and then from information to
knowledge and on to rational action, (a) by
laying open the validity claims that underpin
each step and (b) by subjecting these claims to
argumentative examination by all those
concerned. The methodological decision of
submitting to discursive examination all the
assumptions that lead us up the stairs is what I
mean by the discursive principle in the context
of ISD. The paper suggests using the
discursive principle, along with the
philosophical staircase, as an essential device
not only for clarifying theoretically the validity
claims involved in information systems
definition, design, and development but also
for promoting reflective ISD practice.
Organization of the paper. In Sections
2-4, I propose to look briefly at each of the
three core concepts of “information,”
“knowledge,” and “rational” action in terms of
the philosophical issues they raise from the
perspective of the basic disciplines or theories
mentioned in Table 1. We will see how the
discursive principle emerges from these
philosophical traditions as an indispensable
device both for understanding and for
examining the validity claims that each
concept implies. To avoid boring readers with
philosophical rudiments with which most may
be familiar, I have summarized a few
elementary aspects of each basic theory (as
mentioned in Table 1) in frames marked
“Excurses.” Readers may skip or consult these

excurses according to their needs. Even so, the
philosophical staircase of ISD raises issues that
reach far beyond what I can hope to achieve in
a single paper. I thus do not claim to do justice
to all the issues involved; rather, I try to focus
on some aspects that I find particularly helpful
for going up the stairs, such as the role that the
discursive principle may play. Section 5 will
then offer a summary interpretation of the
implications of the staircase for ISD and will
briefly consider the example of hospital
information systems to illustrate the practical
relevance of this interpretation. This will
conclude Part 1.
Part 2 begins with Section 6. It offers a
review of three papers from the ISD literature
that I find exemplary for the ways in which
they consider the discursive principle. We will
conclude that if the discursive principle is to
gain more practical importance in ISD, we
need to redefine it in terms of a “critical turn,”
that is, an approach to reflective practice that
focuses on dealing critically with the inevitable
deficits of validation rather than understanding
discourse as a means of validation of the
claims involved in ISD. Section 7 will then
outline a discursive framework to this end; a
framework that should help readers in
identifying and examining concrete issues as
they arise in ISD practice at all levels of the
staircase. The framework is based on my work
on critical systems thinking – especially my
“critical systems heuristics” (Ulrich 1983) –
and is called critically systemic discourse, for
reasons that I will explain. The final Section 8
will consider a practical case and outline a
three-stage model for the practical application
of the framework.

2

THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF
INFORMATION

What do we mean by “information”?
Philosophically speaking, information science
and technology (IT) appear to have got it
wrong from the start. Their conceptual and
technical tools basically deal with the
processing and transmission of signals (or
messages, streams of signs) rather than with
“information.” Signals are arrangements of
material (physical or electronic) signs that may
carry some information but do not themselves
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tell us what information they carry, except in
the syntactic sense of conforming to the rules
of a certain syntax. This is certainly no news,
yet we continue to refer to issues of signal
processing and transmission in terms of
“information theory.” The language of

information theory makes us easily forget that
not information theory but semiotics, the
general theory of signs and symbols, is the
fundamental philosophical theory on which we
should rely for understanding and defining
“information” (Excursus 1).

Excursus 1: Semiotics. “The general study of symbolic systems, including language.”
(Blackburn 1994, p. 346) The theory goes back to work by Charles S. Peirce (1931-35) on a
general theory of signs and symbols and was elaborated by Charles Morris (1938, 1946) as
a general study of linguistic meaning. Both authors distinguished between three fundamental
(because irreducible) aspects or branches of semiotics:
Syntactics analyzes the relation of signs to other signs within a language, that is, the
structure (syntax or grammar) of well-formed messages. The essence of good syntax is
clarity of FORM considering given rules of coding – the “signs” constituting a message are
understood.
Semantics analyzes the relation of signs or messages to that which they signify, that is, their
meaning. The essence of good semantics is clarity of CONTENT considering given contexts
of interpretation – the “signification” of a message is understood.
Pragmatics, finally, analyzes the relation of signs or messages to their users, that is, the way
they are used in contexts of communication and action. The essence of good pragmatics is
clarity of CONSEQUENCES considering given contexts of application – the “significance” of
a message is understood.
The relationship between these three aspects under which symbolic systems can be
considered is asymmetric: pragmatic clarity of meaning presupposes semantic clarity and
semantic clarity presupposes syntactic clarity, whereas syntactic clarity presupposes neither
semantic nor pragmatic meaning. It is therefore useful to conceive of the three aspects in
terms of semiotic levels, that is, levels of communication and (mutual) understanding.
Information theory, due to its mathematical and statistical character, can deal with the
syntactic level of symbolic systems only. It thus cannot supersede semiotics as a theoretical
basis of information systems design. A similar relationship holds between IT and IS.
Information processing machines and software can grasp meaning (and thus “understand”
and “communicate” messages) at the syntactic level only; the semantic and pragmatic levels
require subjective intentionality and intersubjective exchange, which are distinctive of human
cognition and communication. For handling these aspects, information systems remain
dependent on their human designers, operators, and users.

Semiotics and Information Theory –
two concepts of “information.” Semiotics
includes issues of information theory but
cannot be reduced to it (Figure 2, steps 1-3).
As is well known, information theory
(Shannon and Weaver 1949) defines the
information content of a message – a stream of
signs – by the amount of uncertainty that the
message eliminates in a statistical sense. What
it tells us is “Cheers, it’s me, forget about all
the other bloody combinations of signs that
might have arrived in my place!” The lower
the relative frequency of that particular
combination of signs is, given a certain stock
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of signs that can be transmitted, the higher is
its “information content.” Who cares (in
information theory) how poor or unimportant
the content of the message may actually be to
the receiver. Contrary to what we were assured
by McLuhan (1964), the medium is perhaps
the massage but definitely not the message.
In semiotics, by contrast, information is
a concept that is defined at all three levels of
communication. By implication, information
we give or receive is not clear unless the
intended contexts of interpretation (semantic
clarity) and application (pragmatic clarity) are
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equally clear (Figure 2, steps 2 and 3). The
first lesson, then, is that IT/IS must learn to
live with information in the richer sense of
semiotics; which is why the discursive
principle comes into play already before the
first half-landing of the staircase.
Given that we probably have to live for
some time with the ambivalent language of
information processing, let us begin by saying
what we mean when we talk of “information.”
Let us be clear at all times about which
semiotic levels we intend. To avoid constant
awkward references to the semiotic levels
concerned, as much as continuous blurring of
philosophically distinct categories, I propose
we indicate the intended concept of
information by means of the two alternative
indices “IT” (informationIT) or “ISD”
(informationISD) whenever there might be any
doubt at which semiotic level we are arguing.
With reference to steps 1-3 of the staircase we
might equally talk of information (1),
information (2) and information (3), but the
first solution probably has the advantage of
being more self-explanatory. As the terms
should make obvious, informationIT is defined
at the syntactic level, whereas informationISD
is sufficiently defined at the semantic and
pragmatic levels only (each of which
presupposes the preceding semiotic levels).
We then gain these two concepts of
information:
1.

2.

InformationIT comprises everything that
can be defined at the syntactic level, that
is, all inputs, means, and outputs of data
processing. “Data” in this context means
records that can be processed (objects of
computer processing) including the rules
of inference and programs by which they
are processed and the results of such
processing, all regarded at the syntactic
level. This is different from the everyday
concept of “data,” which usually refers to
circumstances regarded at all three
semiotic levels.
InformationISD, by contrast, comprises
everything that humans do with “data” (in
both senses of the word) at the semantic
and pragmatic levels. These activities
involve human capabilities such as

consciousness
and
intentionality,
abstraction and reasoning, feeling and
intuition, doubting and questioning,
sensitivity to changing contexts, and last
but not least: intersubjective exchange and
understanding. For the sake of brevity, I
will refer to these diverse capabilities as
“human cognition and communication”.
I will use the two indices except when
the intended concept of information is clear or
I mean both concepts at once. We can now
redefine our preliminary concept of an
information system (as contained in our
definition of ISD) a bit more accurately: An
information system is any systematic
arrangement for providing a defined group of
people with informationISD for purposeful
action; to the extent that the arrangement relies
on IT, it must include provisions for
into
transforming
informationIT
ISD
information .
Since only humans are capable of
appreciating and handling informationISD, it
follows that a proper design ideal for
information systems must not design human
cognition and communication out of the
system. This may look like a rather obvious
statement; but the fact of the matter is that
many IS designs imply precisely this mistaken
design ideal – “design man out of the system”
(fortunately, ideals rarely come true). The
problem is, so long as we reduce semiotics to
information theory, machines are obviously far
more efficient than people in processing
“information” (i.e., informationIT).
Learning from history: the “Fitts
list.” In the engineering and scientific
management literature, there is a classical
story illustrating the problem. Fitts (1951) was
an engineer who published a seminal article on
the question of how systems functions in
automated systems should be allocated
optimally between men and machines, a
question known as the problem of human
factor engineering. He devised an empirical
solution that became famous as the “Fitts list.”
The list consisted of two columns, one
standing for “man,” the other for “machine,”
and so contrasted the functions that humans
empirically perform better than machines to
those in which they are inferior to machines.
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Fitts’ contribution was widely hailed as
breakthrough towards a clean engineering
solution. The only problem was, it did not
work.
Why? There was nothing wrong with
Fitts’ list as far as his assignment of human
versus machine functions to the two columns
of the list is concerned – it was never found
incorrect. In an insightful discussion of the
problem, Jordan (1963, with reference to
Birmingham and Taylor 1954) uncovered the
flaw in Fitts’ assumption of man-machine
comparability:
To the extent that man becomes
comparable to a machine we do not really
need him any more since he can be
replaced by a machine. (Jordan 1963, p.
162)

The faulty concept is that human
performance can be measured in the same
numerical terms as that of machines. The
implication, of course, is that man is best when
his part in automated systems is kept as small
as possible. Such an approach actually begs the
question. Instead of properly examining the
question of how we can achieve an optimal
interaction of man and machine – “optimal”
for both man and machine – it looks at the
problem in machine terms only and thereby
ends up with a faulty alternative of man or
machine – a classical case of suboptimization.
In the light of our philosophical
staircase, the diagnosis of the problem is even
more obvious. IT/IS must overcome its
(supposed) theoretical foundation in a onelevel conception of information. There is a
need for redefining information science in
terms of a much more comprehensive, multilevel philosophy of information, of which
semiotics forms the foundation. We may
always try push out the boundaries of what we
can achieve at the syntactic level; but we
should not assume that we thereby jump from
step 1 to step 2 of the philosophical staircase
and somehow, miraculously, transform
informationIT into informationISD. That
appears to be exactly what did some of the
most eminent founding fathers of the field
(Newell, Shaw and Simon 1958, 1960, 1972)
when they assured us that the heuristic
capabilities of information processing systems
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could achieve the same results that have been
traditionally associated with human problemsolving capabilities. (For an earlier critique of
their claim in the light of a multi-level
conception of problem-solving systems, see
Ulrich 1977.)
Toward an adequate semiotic
foundation of ISD. Concerning the role of
semiotics as a foundation stone, a number of
helpful discussions are already available. A
few I have found helpful are Andersen (1991,
1992), Stamper (1991, 1996), Goguen (1992),
Mingers (1996), Ngwenyama and Lee (1997),
Klein and Myers (1999), and Nissen (1992,
2002). Andersen (1991, p. 465) summarizes
the case well: “A key assumption of this
approach is that IS should fruitfully be viewed
as media for social interaction and not as
models of reality.” The staircase suggest that
this assumption is indeed necessary since
many of the difficulties we need to face at
higher levels are strongly related to the
normative2 character of all interpersonal
practice, including IS.

2

“Normative” is a word that is no longer well
understood in contemporary everyday English, yet
there is no good substitute for it. In its most general
sense, it means as much as “implying value
judgments.” When we assert an opinion, or a
proposition or any other kind of validity claim that
depends on value judgments, we usually imply
tacitly that our value judgments are valid, that is,
that others ought to accept them and should act
accordingly. Insofar we give our claim a
“normative” meaning in the somewhat stronger
sense of the term in which it is usually employed in
philosophy, namely, as establishing norms for
adequate (“right”) intersubjective behavior.
“Norms” are values that are recognized to provide
binding criteria or standards for assessing social
interaction or action that may affect others. In the
present paper, I use phrases such as “normative
content” and “normative validity” in this second,
stronger sense of implying claims to rightness. I
speak of normative content in the double sense of
the normative assumptions (presuppositions) that
underpin a claim and of the normative implications
(live practical consequences) it may have (if
accepted) for the different parties concerned.
Accordingly, by “normative validity” (a claim
raised by step 6 of our philosophical staircase of
ISD) I mean the validity of a claim with respect to
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The semiotic insight into the social
interactive nature of IS is indeed fundamental
for any effort to move beyond step 1 of the
staircase. Somewhat amazingly, though,
Anderson and many of his colleagues do not
seem to take this insight as seriously as one
might expect. Not atypically, Anderson rapidly
narrows down the perspective he just opened
up, by focusing on interface design from a user
perspective rather than an observer
perspective; consequently semiotics is seen as
“a theoretical background for user centered
systems design and assessment” (1991, p.
466). This looks to me rather like a confusion
of semiotics with hermeneutics. Hermeneutic
(interpretive, soft systems) approaches in many
fields, including the approaches I am familiar
with in the fields of management science and
systems thinking, tend to avoid issues raised
by the normative nature of social practice; they
focus on the subjective rather than the
intersubjective nature of informationISD. There
are some notable exceptions among the
contributions to IS semiotics I have mentioned,
though (e.g., Goguen 1992; Nissen 1992 and
2002). Semiotic analysis as I understand it
aims beyond hermeneutics. It treats the
pragmatic dimension as an integral aspect of
semiotic clarity and therefore considers the
“practical bearings” (in Peirce’s original
wording) of information for interactive social
practice. Practical bearings mean that “the
design of an information system is a natural
occasion
for
power
struggles,”
for
“information systems are powerful engines for
concentrating and applying power.” (Goguen
1992, p. 11) Adequate definition of
information requirements for a specific system
cannot escape this implication. I can only
assume the reason for the frequent escape into
a
predominantly
hermeneutic
“user”
perspective is that semiotics alone cannot do
the job. However, our staircase does not
require us to burden semiotics with the entire
load. It is sufficient that we don’t try to build
on faulty concepts from the start; we need not
solve all problems of ISD within the first three
steps.

both its normative presuppositions and its actual
consequences for those affected. Compare Excursus
3.

Let us, then, be clear in what way a
semiotic foundation of ISD needs to go beyond
a mere “user” perspective. The point is that
this perspective does not capture the full extent
to which human cognition and communication
(or the “human factor,” in the terms of human
factor engineering) are constitutive of
informationISD. We need to consider not only
the ways people use IS but also, and more
fundamentally, the ways in which information
is socially defined and socially momentous. In
any field of human activity, what passes for
information can be a very complex and
controversial issue and can affect the lives and
social life-worlds of many people beyond
those involved as system designers and users.
Adequate design of user interfaces is certainly
necessary but by no means sufficient to do
justice to this sort of issue. Whose information
is it, where does it come from (garbage in,
garbage out)? How reliable or unreliable,
accurate or biased, unambiguous or meaning
different things to different people is it? What
are those informed supposed to do with it, for
which purposes should they rely on it and for
which other purposes they shouldn’t? What
consequences may be linked to not using the
information in the way it is supposed to be
used, not only for those who are supposed to
“use” it but also for others who may not be
involved in its definition and use? In short,
what ought to pass for adequate information
and how might it affect people?
As an illustration we may think of the
sophisticated hospital information systems that
nowadays keep track of patients’ medical and
administrative data. How systems designers,
medical and administrative staff define and
manage diagnosis-related and treatment data
(informationIT) and later use it as
informationISD (case histories, case-mix
information,
quality
control,
hospital
performance indicators etc.) can affect the
patients’ health considerably and may
sometimes be a matter of life and death for
those affected, apart from having considerable
financial implications. Or take the global
weather
information
systems
that
meteorologists use to produce our daily
weather report: weather forecasts too can
become a matter of life and death for many
people (not only meteorologists) and in any

Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 3:3, 2001.

63

Werner Ulrich

case may have important economic
implications for many sectors of society.
Aren’t all these questions linked to the
semantic
and
pragmatic
content
of
information? Semiotic clarification as I intend
it in steps 1-3 of the staircase means that in any
concrete ISD project, we need to explore this
kind of questions empirically for the particular
contexts of interpretation and application
concerned, according to Peirce’s pragmatic
maxim:
Consider what effects, which might
conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the
object. (Peirce 1878, para. 402)

Just think of the “object of our
conception” as the information output of an IS
to see the relevance of Peirce’s criterion of
meaning. Note that Peirce does not ask us to
consider what practical bearings we conceive
the object of our conception to have for
ourselves only. The meaning of information is
not sufficiently defined by what it means to the
user and how useful it is to him; rather, it
includes all the implications it may have for all
people concerned (cf. my discussion of the
pragmatic maxim in Ulrich 2001, pp. 11-14).
Of course Peirce was thinking of scientific
practice rather than ISD practice; his primary
concern was that empirical scientists should
make the meaning of their propositions or
hypotheses clear by defining them in
observational terms that allow of experimental
examination. But it is certainly not against the
spirit of his concern for clear thinking if we
interpret the pragmatic maxim as a kind of
quality control for semiotic clarity in all fields
of research and practice.
Concerning ISD research practice, the
good news is that researchers, both in the
development of new generations of software
(Nissen 2002) and in the design and
implementation of specific information
systems (Checkland and Holwell 1998), are
now increasingly taking up semantic and
pragmatic aspects. Checkland and Holwell’s
soft systems approach is exemplary for the
clarity of thinking it brings to ISD practice;
Nissen’s reflections are equally exemplary for
a new attention to creating value for software
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users through social and hermeneutic-dialectic
thinking. I have no doubt that such approaches
can equip developers better than before in
dealing with the needs of users. I see in both
contributions a lot of potential for involving
other stakeholders, too, and thus for doing
even more justice to the spirit of pragmatic
clarification that I am advocating. The bad
news is only that the prevailing practice of
ISD, whether “hard” or “soft,” appears to be
rather different. As far as it is opening up to
softer approaches, it risks reducing semiotic
clarification to interface design, and interface
design to the user perspective.
My plea is for taking Peirce’s pragmatic
maxim seriously and hence, for striking a
better balance between the hermeneutic
concern about understanding the situation of
users and an emancipatory concern for the
situation of other stakeholders. That is what an
appropriate semiotic foundation as I advocate
it is all about. Of course, semiotic analysis
alone cannot secure an adequate reconciliation,
but at least it can draw attention to possible
sources of failure and conflict. These can then
at least become an issue of discourse among all
those concerned.
The discursive kernel of information.
At a merely syntactic level of information
processing, the clarity of a message can be
tested “mono-logically” either by a lonely
human subject or by a computer according to
general rules of well-formedness. As soon as
we move to the semantic and pragmatic levels,
clarity (as well as richness of content) requires
intersubjective sharing of context-bound
meaning and relevance. As the questions just
considered in connection with the pragmatic
maxim imply, the definition of informationISD,
like that of knowledge, is socially constructed
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). It may
consequently be socially more or less
acceptable or contested. “Testing” then
requires
communicative interaction
to
negotiate common definitions of relevant
contexts of interpretation and application.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding,
reaching mutual understanding on semantic
and pragmatic meaning is basically a prediscursive affair; either we share a definition
or we don’t. If we don’t, we are not either right
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or wrong, we simply don’t share the same
interpretive framework. Strictly speaking,
discourse comes into play only when we look
at the practical implications of some shared or
contested definition of informationISD, for
these implications entail claims that can be
decided discursively.
By beginning to consider such implicit
claims as early as at the semiotic levels of the
staircase, we sneak a look at higher levels of
the staircase, as it were. I cannot see any
substantial reason why we shouldn’t, as long
as it serves a critical purpose in clarifying and
defining what passes for information. In
practice the two issues of sharing meanings
and accepting claims are so closely intertwined
that we tend to speak naturally of “claims” to
information. I think it is symptomatic indeed
that
“mutual
understanding”
refers
simultaneously to shared meaning and to
agreement on normative implications, so much
so that when we refer to mutual understanding
it is rarely clear to what extent the minimal and
to what extent the maximum interpretation are
intended. What is clear, however, is that the
nine conceptual steps of the staircase are
closely interdependent, so much so that in
practice they cannot be separated neatly from
each other. Nor should they, as we may
conclude from everything we have learned
thus far.
From a critical point of view, discursive
testing of claims to informationISD is therefore
always a relevant idea. When mutual
understanding among IS designers breaks
down, even if it is only intended in the
minimal sense of shared and clear meanings,
disagreement about intended practical
implications is usually not far away. For these
reasons I would suggest that in sound ISD
practice, decisions on what passes for
informationISD should always be seen as
calling for discursive procedures, for such
decisions represent the points where discourse
stops (perhaps before it has begun) and
subsequently
becomes
frozen
into
informationIT. No matter how distorted the
communicative practice underpinning such
decisions may be, they still embody frozen
discourses and therefore, as a matter of

principle, should be open to previous and
subsequent discursive challenge.
In conclusion, if information systems
are to provide people with meaningful and
relevant informationISD for purposeful action,
they need to support, and to be supported by,
adequate discursive practices. We cannot hope
to achieve clarity and relevance of
informationISD without giving a systematic
place to the discursive principle from the very
beginning.

3

THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF
KNOWLEDGE

What do we mean by “knowledge”?
Taking up what we have just noted, mutual
understanding about the meaning and
relevance of the content of some statement (its
informationISD content) is not the same as
validity. When we make a statement, we not
only imply that its meaning is clear at all three
semiotic levels (i.e., everyone concerned
understands what we say) but also that what
the statement states is accurate, that is, free
from errors and omissions. With this sort of
claim we move from the first to the second
theoretical level in Table 1, from semiotic to
epistemological
considerations.
Epistemological reflection and discourse begin
when we move from shared understanding
about what counts as information (semiotic
clarity) to the question of what counts as
knowledge
(epistemological
clarity).
Epistemology is the philosophical discipline
concerned with the nature, origin and
validation of knowledge, or shortly, the theory
of knowledge.
It must astonish that in many scientific
disciplines (both basic and applied sciences),
the theories of knowledge underpinning
theoretical propositions as well as practical
proposals are hardly ever made explicit.
Researchers usually write and talk as if they
were a matter of course. This may be
unproblematic in many natural science
disciplines, where well-proven experimental
methodologies make sure that false claims will
sooner or later be discovered; in the social and
applied disciplines, however, a lack of clarity
as to what counts as knowledge can become a
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serious source of deception, since in these
fields false claims are not so easily uncovered.
Consequently, explaining and questioning
what counts as knowledge – reflecting on the
assumed theory of knowledge – is never a bad
idea. What, then, do we mean by
“knowledge”?
Basically, in the context of academic
and professional work, knowledge means
propositional knowledge that something is the
case (as in “water is a compound of hydrogen
and oxygen”; “there is a 75% chance that it
will rain tomorrow”) or about how something
can be done (as in “water can be generated
from the combustion of hydrogen”), rather
than non-propositional knowledge in the sense
of mere familiarity with a thing or a person (as
in “I know Peter”). Propositional knowledge is
what a true proposition says is (or will, or
may) be the case, provided the proposition can
be substantiated by compelling reasons. That is
to say, knowledge requires more than a belief
or guess that is accidentally true; it requires
justified, true, belief – the knower must be able
to explain why he asserts that something is the
case. If I simply guess that it will rain
tomorrow but cannot explain why this is so,
then I do not “know” but merely assert that it
will rain. It is thus not sufficient for a
knowledge claim that the proposition in
question is confirmed by experience; if that
were so, any guess that happens to be
confirmed by experience would represent
knowledge. Knowledge in the sense intended
here depends on the possibility of making an
argument to the truth of a proposition. A
knowledge claim implies that the question of
truth is rationally decidable.
Unfortunately, there is little agreement
in the theory of knowledge about what
constitutes a satisfactory argument for truth.
Epistemology is a difficult and controversial
subject, perhaps because it is so fundamental
to philosophy and science. Like all
fundamental philosophical problems, this one
does not lend itself to a complete solution. It is
thus hardly surprising that the history of
philosophy has produced a great number of
different theories of knowledge. Excursus 2
gives an overview.
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The discursive turn of epistemology. I
would like to make three basic observations
concerning the present state of the theory of
knowledge.
1.

I think is fair to describe the development
of the theory of knowledge as leading
from two opposing, one-sided conceptions
of knowledge as being grounded either in
reason or in experience, toward
increasingly sophisticated attempts at
explaining the way in which reason and
experience
together
can
ground
knowledge. It is clear today that only in
conjunction, reason and experience can
produce knowledge; they are but two sides
of the coin that entitles us to claim
knowledge. The precise nature of this
conjunction, however, remains a matter of
dispute in contemporary epistemology.

2.

Neither of the theories of knowledge
proposed thus far provides inquirers with
an operational theory of truth, that is, a
criterion that would allow “objective”
(unambiguous) decisions on disputed truth
claims; hence, in the practice of research,
truth remains a matter of dispute, too.

3.

In order to overcome the wrong alternative
of grounding knowledge either in
experience or in reason, all contemporary
theories of knowledge rely on some
discursive procedure as the means by
which a synthesis of the two sources of
knowledge (or of its justification) is
accomplished.
This
distinguishes
contemporary approaches fundamentally
from Kant’s (1781) earlier synthesis,
which still located reason in the mind of
an abstract, individual inquirer whose
“apperception” (reflective perception of
sensory experience) assured some
“correspondence” between cognition and
reality. (For a detailed analysis and
reconstruction
of
the
continuing
importance of Kant’s thinking for
epistemology and practical philosophy
today and especially for a critical systems
approach to the applied disciplines, see
Ulrich 1983, chapters 3-5).
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Excursus 2: Epistemology. “The branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of
knowledge. Traditionally, central issues in epistemology are the nature and derivation of
knowledge, the scope of knowledge, and the reliability of claims to knowledge.” (Flew 1984,
p. 109). The theory of knowledge should not be confused or equated with so-called science
theory, a sub-discipline of the theory of knowledge that focuses on the model of empiricalanalytic science and tends to see this model as providing the only legitimate approach to
epistemological issues.
The nature and derivation of knowledge: Traditionally, debates between empiricists and
rationalists focused mainly on the question of the origin and nature of knowledge (in the
terms of contemporary science theory, the “context of discovery”). For the empiricists, there
can be no knowledge beyond the limits of experience; for the rationalists, all experience is
constructed by the human mind. If there is any conclusive result of these debates, it is that
the alternative is wrongly posed; only an approach that strikes a balance can hope to provide
a satisfactory account.
The reliability of claims to knowledge: In contemporary philosophy, the focus has shifted to
the question of how claims to knowledge can be validated (the so-called “context of
justification”). This question is more immediately relevant to the crucial issue of what, in
practice, should count as “knowledge.” The central problem is the search for a satisfactory,
operational theory of truth.
Theories of truth: The classical empiricist theory is the correspondence theory of truth,
according to which true propositions must conform to what is empirically the case, or more
accurately, to “facts” uncovered by systematic observation; its main difficulty is that
statements of facts are themselves propositions – no kind of systematic observation
provides a direct, objective access to the world. The classical rationalist theory is the
coherence theory of truth, according to which (unless the world is self-contradictory) true
propositions must conform to other true propositions; its main difficulty is that the internal
consistency of a system of propositions does not provide any guarantee that the propositions
are in touch with reality.
Although the basic point of both theories appears valid, both run into fundamental problems;
neither has managed to operationalize its criterion of truth satisfactorily. Later theories of
truth, beginning with Kant’s (1781) Critique of Pure Reason, therefore attempt some
synthesis of the two classical positions. The basic idea is that reason and experience not
only depend on each other but also can control one another to make sure that either is
limited (in Kant’s words) to “its lawful claims.”
A major example is the pragmatic theory of truth of Peirce and James (not to be confused
with Peirce’s pragmatic criterion of meaning), according to which a proper synthesis of
reason and experience must prove itself by its pragmatic value in guiding human action.
Peirce’s (1931-58) theory is astonishingly modern today in that it also postulates that truth is
the agreement at which a community of all competent inquirers eventually arrives, if only it
investigates the matter long and carefully enough – an idea that anticipates later
evolutionary and discursive conceptions of knowledge. Among these, Popper’s (1959, 1963,
1972) critical rationalism is an influential approach that has gained wide acceptance among
natural scientists as a theory of empirical science. It suggests that theoretical propositions
cannot be verified but can only be falsified, namely, by observational statements that
contradict them; and that observational statements, because they are always theoryimpregnated (i.e., depend on concepts that cannot be inferred from experience), cannot
ultimately be validated either but can only be subject to intersubjective criticism, so-called
“critically-rational discussion.” The most contemporary example is Habermas’ (1979, 1984)
consensus theory of truth, according to which all propositions imply a number of different
validity claims that can be validated only through rationally motivated discourse under
conditions of symmetric chances of argumentation by everyone concerned.
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The discursive kernel of knowledge:
Peirce. Peirce (1931-58) first replaced Kant’s
lonely transcendental subject by a community
of competent inquirers and introduced the idea
that truth is not a matter of individual certainty
concerning “correspondence” but rather a
matter of possible reference, within a
theoretically infinite community of inquirers,
to the judgment of others. This is Peirce’s
famous definition of truth:
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate, is what
we mean by truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That
is the way I would explain reality. (Peirce
1878, par. 407)

Ever since this discursive turn of
epistemology, reason as the indispensable
counterpart of experience needs to be
conceived not only in terms of individual
reflection and judgment but also in terms of
cogent intersubjective argumentation. Intersubjective argumentation is what we call
discourse. To be sure, discourse for Peirce was
not, and still cannot be for us today, an
alternative to empirical science; rather, it
should be understood as a constitutive element
of the method of science. The success of the
scientific method demonstrates not the
soundness of empiricism (as many people still
seem to believe today) but rather the value of
using discursive procedures for validating or
challenging empirical evidence. In this sense,
the discursive principle has become an
indispensable cornerstone of all contemporary
theories of knowledge.
Among today’s discursive theories of
knowledge, those advanced by Karl Popper
and Jurgen Habermas stand out as particularly
innovative and influential. I have given
detailed critical appreciations of both
approaches elsewhere (Ulrich 1983, Ch. 1 for
Popper and Ch. 2 for Habermas) and thus can
limit my discussion here to a few essential
aspects, without any claim to doing justice to
either work.
Their basic idea is the same as that of
Peirce:
empirical
evidence,
whatever
procedures we use to gain it, does not speak
for itself but requires a community of
competent inquirers to decide on what it tells
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us and how accurate some theoretical account
of it is. The only way to decide on the
conclusiveness of empirical evidence for
theoretical claims is by argumentation and
eventual consensus among all those concerned
and qualified. Accordingly, when we speak of
the discursive principle, we mean the
methodological concept of validating claims to
knowledge and rationality through intersubjective argumentation among all those
concerned and qualified.
In the present context, the discursive
principle raises two main questions: First, what
should be considered to be an appropriate form
of discourse? Second, what validity claims
need we examine discursively when we want
to take the step from information to
knowledge? I will first give a very short
summary of Popper’s answer to these two
questions. Subsequently I will describe
Habermas’ answer in more detail as it is much
more helpful for our purpose of analyzing the
philosophical staircase of ISD. I invite readers
to follow my account since (I suspect)
Habermas’ style of writing is not particularly
accessible to many IS professionals, while on
the other hand less than accurate accounts are
as common in the IT/IS literature as elsewhere.
Contemporary models of discourse
(1): Popper. Popper’s (1959, 1963, 1972)
critical rationalism has become seminal
through the way it redefined the
epistemological problem of how science can
justify its claims to knowledge. It shifted the
focus from empirical verification of
propositions to empirical and discursive
falsification. Popper’s falsification principle
has found wide acceptance in the empirical
sciences, and it has important consequences
for our understanding of the process of
scientific research and the growth of
theoretical knowledge. It means that
researchers, rather than trying to avoid
theoretical propositions that may turn out to be
wrong, should try to formulate hypotheses that
lend themselves to empirical falsification. On
this depends the progress of science. The
beauty of Popper’s approach is that it frees
scientists from the obligation to be error-free:
contrary to what had been assumed before
Popper and is still popularly believed, the aim
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of science is not to verify its propositions but
rather to falsify them!
Unfortunately, however, Popper’s
discursive falsification procedure relies on a
rather impoverished model of discourse. Its
criterion of successful falsification attempts
consists in logical contradiction between the
theoretical proposition at issue and some
observational statement that has been accepted
by a community of inquirers. As Popper likes
to say, deductive logic is the “organon of
critique.” Such a criterion of criticism cannot
deal with the normative implications that the
acceptance of a proposition may have in a
context in which a decision, recommendation,
or action is based on it. I suspect this is a major
reason why Popper tends to ignore such issues
or else to equate practical with merely
instrumental reason (on the concepts of
instrumental and practical reason, see Section
4 of this paper).
Contemporary models of discourse
(2): Habermas’ “formal pragmatics.”
Habermas’ (1984) Theory of Communicative
Action offers the most elaborate model of
discourse available today. For this reason it has
gained ever-increasing recognition and
importance in recent years, especially in the
applied and social sciences. As the name
suggests, Habermas’ theory introduces another
far-reaching shift of focus, from the theory of
knowledge to a theory of “communicative
action,” by which he means action oriented to
reaching mutual understanding. This makes it
relevant to our philosophical staircase: it
promises to take us upstairs from knowledge to
rational action. Accordingly, we will draw on
the theory also in the next section, where it
will help us to clarify the meaning of rational
action. In the present context, the theory of
communicative action matters to us for a
different reason: its underlying “formal
pragmatics”
(also
called
“universal
pragmatics,” see Habermas 1979, 1984) can
help us to understand the validity claims
involved in the conceptual step from
information (semiotic analysis) to knowledge
(epistemological analysis).
By formal pragmatics, Habermas
(1984, p. 139 and p. 277) understands the
reconstruction of universal conditions of

successful communicative action in terms of a
“pragmatics of language,” that is, a theory of
speech acts that starts from the pragmatic level
of language analysis in semiotics. A speech
act, according to Austin (1962) and Searle
(1969), is an utterance (an elementary unit of
communication by means of language) that
expresses a statement, a question, a command,
and so on. Habermas calls his analysis of the
pragmatic level of speech formal to distinguish
it from the original pragmatic approach of
Peirce (1878, 1931-35) and Morris (1938,
1946), which aims at an empirical analysis of
particular contexts of communication.
Like other earlier approaches to
analyzing communication (e.g., in information
theory, analytical and linguistic philosophy),
formal pragmatics aims to uncover general
conditions of successful communication rather
than
context-bound
characteristics
of
particular speech situations and related
particular competences of individual speakers;
in this sense too it is “formal” or, as Habermas
originally said, “universal.” Unlike these
earlier approaches, including semiotics, formal
pragmatics does not assume that such formal
analysis is possible only in respect to the
syntactic and to some extent also the semantic
dimensions whereas the pragmatic dimension
is accessible to empirical analysis only (e.g.
psycholinguistics
and
sociolinguistics).
Instead, it understands the pragmatic
dimension as an integral dimension of the
logic of speech acts. In this double sense it
represents a “formal pragmatics” of speech
acts. This makes it understandable why
Habermas (1979, pp. 26-29) also calls his
approach a theory of communicative
competence, in contrast to Chomsky’s (1957,
1965) earlier theory of linguistic competence
which focused on the phonetic, syntactic and
semantic properties of language while leaving
the pragmatic dimension to an empirical theory
of linguistic performance.
Let us now look at the general
structures of communicative competence that
Habermas’ analysis reveals. Communicative
competence for Habermas is “the ability of a
speaker oriented to mutual understanding to
embed a well-formed sentence in relations to
reality” (Habermas 1979, p. 29). Three such
relations are crucial in Habermas’ (1979, pp.
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53-68; 1984, pp. 288-295 and 307-309)
analysis:
1.

Speech acts state something about external
reality, that is, “the” world of objects and
circumstances that we may perceive and
describe in a more or less objective
attitude – the constative function of
speech acts. Austin (1962) speaks of
locutionary acts; they state the
propositional (locutionary) content of a
sentence.

2.

Speech acts state something about social
or interpersonal reality, that is, “our”
social life-world of shared norms and
conventions that regulate interpersonal
behavior (in particular the relation
between speaker and hearer) and to which
both speaker and hearer may more or less
conform – the regulative function of
speech acts. Austin (1962) speaks of
illocutionary acts; they express the
intended “mode” of a sentence as an
assertion, promise, command, avowal,
disapproval, and so on.

3. Speech acts express something about the
speaker’s internal reality, that is, “my”
subjective world of wishes, feelings,
intentions, and so on, which a speech act
may make more or less transparent – the
expressive function of speech acts. This is
related to what Austin (1962) calls
perlocutionary acts, that is, the speaker’s
attempt to produce certain effects upon the
feelings, thoughts or actions of the hearer;
but Habermas’ analysis does not follow
Austin in this respect. He agrees with
Austin that perlocutionary acts cannot be
identified through the manifest constative
and regulative functions of speech but
only through an attempt to understand the
speaker’s true intention (for instance, a
command can be expressed in the form of
a polite request or question). In distinction
to locutionary and illocutionary aims,
perlocutionary aims may be pursued
without making them known to the hearer;
a speaker can use them strategically so as
to leave others unclear or even deceive
them about her or his true motive.
Habermas (1984, p. 293f) therefore
considers this possible function of speech
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acts as a form of non-communicative
teleological action rather than of
communicative action. Consequently, he
restricts his analysis of the constitutive
conditions of successful communication to
the locutionary (propositional) and
illocutionary (intersubjective) components
of speech acts, whereby the illocutionary
component includes both the regulative
and the expressive functions: “What we
mean by reaching understanding has to be
clarified solely in connection with
illocutionary acts.” (1984, p. 293) The
expressive function thus stands only for
what a speaker manifests about herself
with an orientation to reaching mutual
understanding.
The three functions of speech acts are
effective simultaneously in every speech act
that aims at mutual understanding. Thus the
propositional content of a speech act always
goes along with its illocutionary force (Austin
1962, p. 99 and p. 147; Habermas 1979, p. 34),
that is, its capacity to move the listener to enter
into a communicative relationship and to
recognize the speaker’s intention as sincere:
“To be understood in a given situation, every
utterance must, at least implicitly, establish
and bring to expression a certain relation
between the speaker and his counterpart. We
can also say that the illocutionary force of a
speech action consists in fixing the
communicative function of the content
uttered.” (Habermas 1979, p. 34).
The propositional and the illocutionary
(relationship-establishing) components of a
speech act form a characteristic double
structure of speech (Habermas 1979, p. 41);
although we may give more importance to one
of them and can vary them separately, the
pragmatic meaning and validity of a speech act
always depend on both components. For
instance, when I say to my partner, “Charles is
driving,” the same propositional content of
Charles’ driving may intend an assertion, a
suggestion, a command, a promise, a warning,
or an expression of disapproval. By making
such a statement, I claim not only that its
propositional content is or will be true
(Charles is or will indeed be driving) but also
that I am right to assert, suggest, promise,
warn, or disapprove, in the sense that my
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intention is both sincere and legitimate and
hence, that the hearer ought to act accordingly.
It follows that every speech act aimed
at mutual understanding simultaneously
embodies validity claims regarding its
constative as well as its regulative and
expressive functions, no matter which one is of
primary importance to the speaker. Apart from
the
implicit
presupposition
of
comprehensibility (semiotic clarity), every
speech act claims (1) the truth of its
propositional content, (2) the rightness
(appropriateness, legitimacy) of its regulative
content, and (3) the truthfulness (sincerity,
authenticity) of the speaker. This is for
Habermas the universal validity basis that
underpins all successful communication.
Let us now return to our philosophical
staircase (Figure 2). In what order should we
incorporate these validity claims? Since the
three claims are raised simultaneously and are
interdependent, the answer is to some extent
arbitrary. However, as in the case of the
preceding semiotic steps, I would argue that
the relationship between them is in a sense
asymmetric. Without some mutual recognition
of sincerity, communication is bound to fail
from the beginning, before its propositional
and regulative functions become fully
effective. The expressive function and hence,
the speaker’s claim to truthfulness, is thus
basic; I therefore locate it at step 4 of the
staircase. Next, given that our point of
departure was the question of what constitutes
propositional knowledge, the constative
function and hence, the claim to truth, seems
essential; I locate it at step 5. Finally, the
philosophical staircase is to help us reflect on
what it means for an IS to provide relevant
information and valid knowledge for
purposeful action. It makes sense to locate the
regulative function of speech and hence, the
claim to rightness, at the highest of the three
epistemological levels, step 6, which can then
lead us on to the subsequent steps concerned
with rational action. Before raising claims to
rationality, it is necessary to identify and
examine the normative implications that
knowledge – the propositional content in
question, provided we accept it as true – may
have in a context of application.

In Figure 2, I therefore locate the three
validity claims in this order. Deviating slightly
from the original terminology of Habermas
that I have used thus far, I will refer to the
three validity claims as claims to expressive,
empirical, and normative validity, respectively;
this conforms to my earlier terminology in
Critical Heuristics, where I referred to the
three components of speech acts and
knowledge claims as regarding their
expressive, empirical, and normative content3
(Ulrich 1983, e.g. p. 135, p. 138).
Finally, a note for those readers who for
whatever reasons may prefer not to base their
practice of critical reflection on Habermas.
Once we have identified the three types of
claims, the reader may also relate them at least
approximately to the general definition of
knowledge from which we started: knowledge
is justified (step 6), true (step 5), belief (step
4). Adopting the staircase as a guide for
reflective practice thus need not mean to
subscribe to a Habermasian critical theory or
even to a Marxist concept of criticism, with
which Habermas is still frequently (although
mistakenly) associated.
From communication to discourse. In
everyday communication, the validity basis of
speech is often treated as unproblematic. The
purpose consists in exchanging information
rather than in examining validity claims. None
of the three validity claims is then made an
explicit subject of discussion. It is sufficient
for the partners to assume (or anticipate, as
Habermas likes to say) that speakers are
prepared to substantiate their claims if asked to
do so, and that it is at all times possible for the
participants to switch to a different mode of
communication in which one or several
validity claims are actually tested. Only when
validity claims do indeed become problematic,
as one of the participants feels compelled to
dispute either the speaker’s sincerity or the
empirical and/or normative content of his
statements, ordinary communication breaks
down and discourse begins. This is where the
discursive principle, once again, comes into

3

Compare note 2 for the meaning of “normative
content.”
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play in our staircase; it provides the
methodological basis for challenging and
defending argumentatively the validity claims
underpinning ordinary communication.
How this is possible is the central
concern of Habermas’ widely known model of
rational discourse. Since the model is well
known, I can be brief; the reader can find a
detailed introduction elsewhere (Ulrich 1983,
pp. 116-151, esp. pp. 137-141). Rational
discourse is argumentative examination of
validity claims under conditions that preclude
systematic distortion as it may result, for
instance, from unequal status, access to
information, skills and power of the
participants. Accordingly, consensus reached
in discourse is “rational” (i.e., rationally
justified rather than merely factual) to the
extent it approximates an “ideal speech
situation.” This is a discourse situation that (a)
would allow all those concerned to participate,
and (b) would ensure to all participants
symmetric chances of argumentation, a
requirement that includes the idea of
symmetric
communicative
competences.
Discourse that examines claims to empirical
validity is called theoretical discourse;
discourse that examines claims to normative
validity is called practical discourse, a concept
that should not be confused with discursive
practice. Expressive validity can equally be
challenged and defended argumentatively; but
ultimately, a speaker can substantiate the
sincerity of his intentions only through
consistent behavior. Strictly speaking, there is
thus no model of rational discourse on claims
to expressive validity, although they can
become thematic in all communication. But let
us not forget that every speech act implies
simultaneous claims to truth, rightness and
truthfulness; in discursive practice the different
kinds of claims and corresponding forms of
discourses cannot be separated as neatly as in
theory. Although the emphasis will usually be
on one type of validity claim at a time, we
should understand theoretical and practical
discourses as ideal types that in practice hardly
exist in pure form.
The
structure
of
cogent
argumentation: Toulmin. Once ordinary
communication has turned into discourse, the
question
remains:
what
is
valid
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argumentation? What constitutes a “strong”
(cogent) as distinguished from a “weak”
(questionable) argument? In order to explain
the precise structure of cogent argumentation,
Habermas relies on Toulmin’s (1964) analysis
of The Uses of Argument. It explains the
structure of a valid argument in terms of the
kinds of speech acts that must follow each
other (Figure 3): A contested conclusion
(claim C) can first be explained by referring to
facts and norms that provide some evidence
for the truth and rightness of the claims
involved (data D). (In the case of controversial
claims to truthfulness, the speaker will be
expected to be able to refer to credible motives
consistent with previous behavior.) Obviously
such evidence may in turn be disputed, or its
relevance for the conclusion in question may
be doubted. The speaker then needs to be able
first, to explain the underlying theoretical
propositions or evaluative standards (e.g.
moral principles) that warrant the inference
from the evidence D to the conclusion C
(warrant W); and second, to provide further
evidence for the claimed facts or norms by
referring to specific observations or needs and
values in their support (backing B).

D

C
W
B

Figure 3: The structure of argument
according to Toulmin
This structure resembles the wellknown Hempel/ Oppenheim (1948) scheme of
explanation, where C = explanandum, D =
initial conditions (in classical logic called the
minor premise), W = law or nomological
hypothesis (major premise), and B = the
empirical basis for W (basic observational
statements); W and D together are also called
the explanans. However, the Hempel/
Oppenheim scheme is conceived in terms of
deductive logic and therefore remains at a
syntactic level of speech; there is no place for
pragmatic considerations (“How does it matter
to me?”) regarding the propositional,
normative and expressive content of the claims
in question. This is different in Toulmin and
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Habermas’ scheme; it captures the pragmatic
level of speech. Speaking at a merely syntactic
level of speech, an argument is conclusive if C
follows logically from D in connection with W
(which in turn needs to be consistent with B).
Moving to the pragmatic level, an argument is
cogent not if it is logically conclusive
(necessary) but if it is logically possible (that
is, the facts and norms it asserts are not in
contradiction with W and B) and if the
discourse participants can be motivated, by
virtue of the backings, to recognize it as valid
(cf. Ulrich 1983, pp. 137ff, and 1988, p. 143).
This
pragmatic
concept
of
argumentative force does not reduce
argumentation to deductive logic but allows
the participants to consider the ways an
argument may concern them with regard to its
normative and expressive as well as its
propositional content; they can require the
proponent to provide good grounds (credible
“evidence,” compelling “reasons”) for all these
validity claims involved. This is why I said
earlier that Habermas’ model of discourse is
much richer than Popper’s model, which we
can now characterize as relying on the
Hempel/ Oppenheim scheme.

regarded as merely factual; anything else
would mean to claim the ideal is real. On
this basis we cannot hope to establish any
validity claims. This is why Habermas’
model cannot supply any operational
criterion for truth or rightness, not
anymore than all the previous theories of
knowledge. As insightful as I find
Habermas’ analysis as a theoretical model
of discourse, we should not misunderstand
it (as many commentators do) as a model
for discursive practice. It can give us some
guidance
for
reflecting
on
the
shortcomings
of
actual
discourse
situations and for improving them, but it
cannot secure rationality. Mistaken for a
prescriptive model, it cannot help but
presuppose what it is meant to achieve,
namely,
a
discourse
situation
characterized by a general symmetry of
discursive chances.
2.

Even if we assume that under fortunate
conditions, the ideal of discursive
symmetry
can
be
sufficiently
approximated to give credibility to
resulting consensus, the underlying
consensus theory of truth still limits the
model’s range of application severely. In
real-world discursive practice, consensus
is a scarce resource. After all, discourse is
required when validity claims are
controversial! In a world of seemingly
ever-increasing pluralism of values and
worldviews, it appears counterproductive
to tie the concept of rationality so
exclusively to ideally rational consensus
as Habermas attempts this. If we really
wish to promote rational practice, I do not
think we should limit our concept of
mutual understanding to this kind of
consensus; can we not at least try to reach
mutual understanding on the reasons for
our differences, and thus to appreciate
genuine conflicts of values, needs and
worldviews in a way that allows for
reasonable cooperation?

3.

Finally, there is a third fundamental
barrier to complete rationality, one that I
find almost totally absent in the huge body
of literature surrounding Habermas’
theory; I mean the problem of boundary
judgments (Ulrich 1983). In the practice

Unfortunately, despite its theoretical
richness, Habermas’ model of rational
discourse shares with Popper’s model, as well
as with all other available approaches to the
theory of knowledge, the lack of an operational
criterion and procedure for discursively
establishing truth or other validity claims in
practice. (I emphasize discursively because an
operational rule in the usual non-discursive
sense of the term would of course be against
the spirit of the discursive approach). I would
like to limit my discussion here to three points
(for a detailed analysis, see Ulrich 1983, pp.
152-172):
1.

The insight that entering into a discourse
implies the anticipation of an ideal speech
situation does little to make the
anticipated situation real. Habermas’
theoretical point is that the ideal speech
situation is operatively effective even
where it is completely counterfactual.
Practically speaking, however, the
implication is that every consensus
reached in discursive practice is to be
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of discourse, even the most completely
rational argumentation needs to begin with
some premises that it cannot justify any
further and needs to end with some
conclusions that it cannot explore any
further. Every chain of argumentation
begins and ends with boundary judgments,
that is, judgments that define the points at
which rational justification stops and
which consequently delimit the range of
application of the validity claims in
question. As I will argue in Section 7, this
problem is of great practical relevance for
developing a reflective approach to
discursive practice: it opens up a path for
dealing
rationally
with
everyday
conditions of incomplete rationality.
The problem of boundary judgments
provides the starting point for my work on
critical systems heuristics, and in particular for
its attempt to pragmatize the ideal speech
situation so that in everyday discourses we can
begin to deal critically with the inevitable lack
of complete rationality. I will introduce this
approach in Section 7 of the present paper.
Our conclusion, once again, is clear:
Knowledge is fundamentally discursive, at
least in the critical sense that claims to
knowledge must always remain open to
argumentative challenge.
ISD’s
loss
of
epistemological
innocence: toward a critical turn. The
development of the theory of knowledge as we
have traced it from Kant to Habermas is
certainly somewhat ambivalent. The more we
understand what it means to claim knowledge
– and I believe we do understand more today
than 100 or 200 years ago – the more we are
compelled to be careful about such claims.
Whether we like it or not, the present state of
the theory of knowledge has relativistic
implications for ISD. The least we can do in
this situation is to make ourselves and
everyone concerned aware of the theory of
truth on which we rely for our claims, and to
be open to the possibility that other people rely
on different theories. What we have noted
before with respect to the coming semiotic turn
of ISD applies to its coming loss of
epistemological innocence as well: it is not a
good idea to rely on faulty conceptual
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foundations just for the sake of avoiding
difficult but fundamental issues. It is certainly
better to face these difficulties, even though
they may have some relativistic implications.
I am not advocating a fashionable
epistemological
relativism,
though.
Recognizing that epistemological relativism is
normal need not mean elevating it to a norm.
Normatively speaking, the point of
epistemological relativism for ISD is a critical
rather than a skeptical one: we cannot avoid
claims to knowledge, but we can learn to do
better when it comes to handling such claims
in an open and self-critical way. Such a critical
turn4 of our epistemological approach offers

4

The idea of a “critical turn” is a key concept of
my understanding of reflective practice in
systems design, and in applied science in
general. Basically, claims to truth, normative
rightness, and rationality imply that we consider
all possible evidence and arguments in favor or
against what is claimed. This conventional ideal
of sufficient justification has clearly holistic
implications – the basic point of “systems
thinking.” In practice, however, the quest for
comprehensiveness is a difficult undertaking.
Claims to comprehensiveness, and hence to
sufficient justification, usually beg the question
of how under normal conditions of imperfect
rationality we can be arguably rational. Particular
standpoints and perspectives unavoidably
condition all our thinking and knowledge. The
question is not whether our knowledge and
arguments are comprehensive but rather, how we
deal with the fact that they never are. From a
self-reflective standpoint, we should never
assume comprehensiveness but instead make a
sustained effort to uncover the conditioned
nature of our claims. Thus, we will regard some
practice of systems design and applied science as
“rational” only to the extent it lays open to
everyone concerned its inevitable selectivity with
respect to the facts and values it considers, as
well as the practical consequences that this
selectivity may have. This is what I mean by a
“critical turn” of our thinking on applied science,
systems design, and rational practice. For a
detailed elaboration of the concept, see Ulrich
1983; short discussions of various aspects of the
critical turn can also be found in Ulrich 1987,
1993, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002a,b and c. In the
present paper, I will take up the implications of
the critical turn in Part 2 (Section 7).
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in assessing the validity claims involved
in applying the information to a specific
context of application. It might even
suggest complete rebuttals (e.g. in the
form of alternative claims C’ inferred
from various combinations of D’ and W’)
and invite users to examine these counterclaims in respect of their relevance to the
specific context at hand. Thus the system
could support users in their task of
into
transforming
informationIT
ISD
information , to avoid what is now
common practice, namely, that users are
led to take the argumentative structures
built into the system for granted. As
Nissen (1989, p. 107) notes, today’s
possibilities of designing interactive user
interfaces offer a computer-supported
approach to allowing users to be
responsible.

not only philosophical but also practical
advantages. It takes from the shoulders of IS
designers the burden of ensuring “true
knowledge”; it frees the profession from the
false and hopeless presumption that
information systems can and should provide
information which by itself can justify claims
to knowledge, regardless of changing contexts
and independent of institutionalized discursive
procedures. It also gives us a new design ideal
for information system that I find challenging
indeed: rather than aiming to establish
knowledge claims, a proper IS design ideal
will incorporate some arrangements that
promote discursive processes of critique
regarding the information it provides; critique,
that is, with respect to its meaning, relevance,
and validity, or in one word, its claims to
represent knowledge.
Designing for sufficient critique rather
than for sufficient justification: could that be a
meaningful design ideal for ISD? I doubt
whether anyone has the answer today, but I
certainly think this kind of design ideal is
worth trying. In this alternative ideal, a good
information system will systematically
promote critique and hence, lay open the ways
in which any piece of information provided
could be criticized and could be used for
substantiating alternative claims to knowledge.
We might say the idea is to internalize
critique, out of the recognition that critique is
the only possible (though imperfect) guarantor
of knowledge. Based on the preceding account
of the Toulmin-Habermas model of
argumentation, two starting points for
internalizing critique offer themselves:
1.

Internal
warrant
disclosing
and
questioning: A good information system
will make explicit the “frozen”
argumentative structure behind its
informationIT. That is, it will not offer
“information” without at the same time
disclosing the evidence (D) and the
warrant (W) as well as corresponding
backings (B) that together support its
claim to informing the user adequately
(C). A very good system might also invite
users to examine the claim, e.g. by
proposing counter-evidence (D’) or
alternative warrants (W’, B’) or by
suggesting questions that might help users

2.

External critical discourse: A good
information system will motivate users not
only to examine the built-in argumentative
structure but also to submit their
assessment of it, as well as the resulting
interpretation and use of informationIT, to
the scrutiny of all those concerned. That
is, it will not offer informationIT as if it
represented informationISD but rather will
cause users to take the step from
to
informationISD
informationIT
consciously,
by
suggesting
some
discursive settings that might be useful for
taking the step and possibly for improving
the argumentation basis. A very good
system might even invite users to assess
the extent to which alternative discourse
settings might better approximate an ideal
speech situation, for instance by
suggesting a checklist of stakeholder
groups that might need to be involved, or
by suggesting alternative sources of
expertise that the system itself has not
considered in its argumentative structure.
Again, interactive user interfaces might
invite users to feed back results of
context-related discursive examinations to
the system and then offer them adapted
information in the form of further
evidence/ counter-evidence, warrants/
counter-warrants, etc.
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These are merely a few preliminary
suggestions for a critical turn inspired by a
careful reading of contemporary discursive
theories of knowledge. A more substantial
outline of the critical turn must await the
announced explication of the problem of
boundary judgments.

4

THE DISCURSIVE KERNEL OF
RATIONAL ACTION

What do we mean by “rational”
action? Since information systems are to
provide people with informationISD for
purposeful action, it astonishes that ISD
theorists have hardly attempted to ground the
field in practical philosophy, the branch of
philosophy concerned with the nature of
rational action. If a conceptual framework of
ISD is to do justice to the pragmatic dimension
of information (step 3 of our philosophical
staircase) as well as to the normative
dimension of knowledge (step 6), it certainly
needs to relate its concepts of pragmatic clarity
of information and normative validity of
knowledge to a conforming concept of rational
action. The point is that clear information and
valid knowledge alone cannot secure rational
practice; only proper standards of rational
action can. Practical philosophy is concerned
with this sort of issue (Excursus 3).
In practical philosophy, an activity is
usually called an action when it involves a
degree of human freedom of the will and
consequently implies the agent’s responsibility
for the possible consequences. The practical in
philosophy is what relates to action, in
particular to this ethical core, as distinguished
from the theoretical, which relates to thought
and knowledge about what is empirically the
case. Of course action also implies purposeful
choice with respect to other aspects, not just
ethical ones; they may concern, for instance,
economic, ecological, and political aspects.
But the core issue of interest to practical
philosophy is the common normative content
of such choices as it manifests itself both in the
value judgments on which the choices rely and
in the actual consequences they may have for
people concerned. With respect to this
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normative content, action can be more or less
reasonable for different parties concerned, that
is, its normative rationality can be contested as
much as its efficacy. Acceptability to all
parties concerned is the basic intent of
practical reason. Although the core of
practical reason relates to the ethical
justification of action, concerns of economic
efficiency, ecological sustainability, political
legitimacy, and so on, will equally matter.
Practical reason cannot ignore these concerns
but will seek to integrate them with ethical
concerns. In this comprehensive sense,
practical reason is concerned with the intrinsic
value
and
interpersonal
“rightness”
(appropriateness, desirability, legitimacy) of
actions, in distinction to merely instrumental
reason or means-end rationality, which is only
concerned with the value (success, utility) of
an action for those who benefit.
We can thus say that practical
philosophy is the philosophical discipline
concerned with the problem of practical
reason: How can we identify and justify the
intrinsic value and rightness of actions?
Obviously, we are once again dealing with a
philosophical ideal. Although we cannot hope
to achieve it completely, it makes an important
practical difference to the common notion of
rational practice. This common notion relies
for its validation on epistemology. Except in
the case of Habermas’ theory of knowledge,
which naturally leads on to the practicalphilosophical steps of the staircase, this notion
gets stuck at step 5 of our staircase. Rational
action is inadequately identified with action
based on justified claims to knowledge;
insofar, and only insofar, an actor is expected
to justify his choices rationally. This is
different as soon as we move to the practical
philosophical level (steps 7-9). Rational
practice, and accordingly the theory of rational
action, now gains another dimension of
rationalization, the dimension of practical
reason. In this second dimension, claims to
rational action oblige actors to make a credible
argument to the interpersonal rightness of their
actions, that is, to defend their underpinning
concepts (or standards) of rationality. Whose
rationality is it? What notion of improvement
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Excursus 3: Practical philosophy. The branch of philosophy concerned with the problem
of rational action. The central issue is how we can rationally determine and justify the
normative content of human action, that is, its underpinning normative principles and
implications. Normative principles (or simply norms) are standards or rules that regulate
human interaction in social contexts, from communication (linguistic norms, norms of
etiquette) to legal (law) and moral norms (proper conduct); normative implications are the
norms that are contained, whether intentionally or not, in the consequences of specific
actions in that they are needed to justify these consequences. In the philosophical tradition
since Aristotle, the use of human reason for analyzing norms of action is called the ‘practical’
use of reason, or simply practical reasoning. The ideal of practical reasoning is practical
reason, that is, rationality of action as judged not only by instrumental success (an action
achieves what it is meant to achieve) but also by the ethical acceptability of its normative
content to all those effectively or potentially affected. Practical philosophy can therefore also
be defined as “the philosophical effort to come to grips with the problem of practical reason.”
(Ulrich 1983, p. 26, and 1988, p. 140)
Like all fundamental philosophical problems, the problem of practical reason – of how we
can secure rational action in the sense of practical reason – does not admit of an easy
solution. A major core problem consists in the question of what rational justification means
when the needs, interests, and worldviews of the people concerned by an action conflict.
Basically we can distinguish two possible approaches to this issue, substantive (or
normative) ethics and formal (or procedural) ethics. Substantive ethics seeks to formulate
norms of action that can guide action in such a way that a rational choice between conflicting
positions becomes possible. Major examples are Aristotle’s ethics of “virtue,” Kant’s (1786,
1788) ethics of “duty,” Bentham’s (1789) ethics of “utility” (utilitarianism), M. Weber’s (1991)
ethics of “responsibility,” A. Schweitzer’s ethics of “respect,” and Rawls’ (1971) ethics of
“fairness” (distributive justice); domain-specific codes of professional conduct in medicine,
legal practice, consulting and so on also fall under this approach. Formal ethics, in contrast,
formulate procedures by means of which agents themselves can identify proper norms of
action. Among these we can distinguish non-discursive (monological) approaches such as
Kant’s “categorical imperative” or Bentham’s “hedonic calculus” (cost-benefit analysis), and
discursive (dialogical) approaches such as the “Socratic method” of dialogical examination of
actions or Apel (1980) and Habermas’ (1990) “discourse ethics.”
In modern pluralistic societies, substantive approaches increasingly lose applicability and
credibility, for they presuppose some societal consensus about fundamental values,
regardless whether we conceive of these values as “virtues,” “utility,” “distributive justice,”
and so on. The procedural approach seems more credible but of course runs into its own
difficulties, particularly with respect to who should be regarded as “competent” (entitled) to
apply the procedure. The distinction between “monological” and “dialogical” approaches
appears relevant in this respect; monological approaches impose the burden of moral
judgment on the individual agent or the group of those involved, dialogical approaches on all
those concerned regardless of whether they are involved. The Toulmin-Habermas model of
discourse offers itself as the most promising procedural approach available at present;
however, its application requires a previous clarification of the standards of “rational” action
that should be used. Obviously, practical-philosophical considerations will need to inform an
adequate framework for a discursive validation or critique of claims to rational action.
Conceiving of rational practice in terms of “applied science” does not represent a sufficient
answer to the problem of rational action.

does it imply? What are its actual
consequences for all those concerned? Can
they be moved to agree of their own free will?
Rational practice thus becomes a twodimensional concept that requires both
theoretical-instrumental
reason
(justified

knowledge and its successful transformation
into effective and efficient action) and
practical
reason
(justified
normative
implications for those involved and affected, a
core concept of critical heuristics, Ulrich
1983).
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Practical reason: a “strong” concept
of rationality. It becomes then clear what is
wrong with the commonplace notion that
rational practice can be secured by means of
applied science and expertise: the underlying
concept of rationality is one-dimensional and
thus is blind to the “other,” practical dimension
of reason. Although it is true that in many
situations rational practice cannot be secured
without applied science, it is equally true that
rational practice cannot be secured by means of
applied science. Insofar they represent
complementary concepts of rationality. But
practical reason is the “stronger” concept:
without its guidance, instrumental reason risks
amounting to mere pseudo-rationality – the use
of efficient means for the wrong ends. The
quest for practical reason thus represents not
just another dimension but rather a higher,
more comprehensive level of rationality, or in
the terms of our philosophical staircase, an
additional discursive step that leads us further
toward a reflective practice of ISD.
Another interesting implication of the
two-dimensional concept of reason is this.
Instrumentally successful action is often
considered to possess a higher degree of
rationality than practical reason (interpersonal
rightness), as it is seen to demonstrate the
“objective” empirical validity of the
underpinning theoretical claims. This may be
true; but from the viewpoint of practical
reason, a rationalization of practice that is
guided only by instrumental reason
nevertheless represents an utterly subjective
form of rationality! It succumbs to a
fundamental confusion of nontechnical
rationality with irrationality (Ulrich 1988, pp.
143-146). Because the underlying concept of
rationality does not include the dimension of
practical reason, disciplines that conceive of
themselves in terms of applied science tend to
reduce practical to instrumental rationality, a
form of rationality that captures only the
expediency of actions for attaining the chosen
ends of those in control of actions;
inadvertently, a merely utilitarian concept of
practical reason is thus adopted.
ISD and practical philosophy. As an
applied discipline, ISD cannot help relying on
strong normative assumptions regarding the
nature of rational practice. What we just
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observed about the “strong” nature of practical
reason suggests it is not sufficient for ISD to
conceive of its rationality in terms of applied
science. Rather, a satisfactory multi-level
framework for ISD as we intend it with our
staircase needs to include practical philosophy
at its highest level of practice reflection and
validation. Given the manifold validation
issues that we have already identified in steps
1-6 of the staircase, how could an applied
discipline as difficult as ISD hope to contribute
to socially rational practice except by
developing a strong tradition of reflective
practice, regarding the strong assumptions in
question as well as the weak theoretical and
philosophical foundations on which it can
presently rely?
This is indeed the question that
motivated me to undertake the present effort of
developing a philosophical staircase for ISD.
The idea is not that IS professionals ought to
become philosophers (although to a certain
extent that might not be a bad idea!); the idea
is, rather, that developing true competence in
ISD is impossible without a new notion of
professional competence in systems design,
one that would be grounded in the quest for
reflective practice. I think an adequate notion
of reflective practice – defined in terms of how
we deal with the problem of practical reason
rather than in the “soft” terms of Schön (1983)
– can indeed provide IS researchers and
practitioners with a new sense of professional
competence. At the same time I am convinced
that a firm grounding of ISD in reflective
practice is also vital for defining – and
improving – the role it plays in and for civil
society. I have dedicated two recent studies to
these issues and found them to be closely
interdependent: reflective practice has a lot to
do with both, the quest for competence (Ulrich
2001) and for a living civil society (Ulrich
2000a).
My question also implies that there is
an urgent need in ISD for developing standards
for critical reflection on practice. I believe
practical philosophy – along with the other
sources of reflection suggested by the
philosophical staircase – can and should
become a major source of such standards. In
particular, I suggest that we refer to practical
philosophy for deriving our concepts of
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rational action, rather than deriving them from
the notion of applied science and from a
foundation in the theory of knowledge alone.
Let us try and see. Once again, Habermas will
be our guide.
A typology of rational action. A
proven method for developing analytically
useful categorizations of complex social
phenomena is by defining ideal types (in this
case, of “rational” action). Ideal types need not
be “realistic” but they should characterize in
pure form, as it were, some crucial features (in
the present case, kernels of rationality) that in
reality combine to the phenomena in question
and in terms of which we can better understand
those phenomena. Such a categorization could
then help us understand and examine the
extent to which concrete actions are assuming
different standards of rationality. The four
basic validity claims contained in speech acts
are such ideal types; however, they apply to
levels 4-6 of our philosophical staircase of
ISD. The issue now is what additional validity
claims we should consider at the three highest
level of staircase, levels 7-9. The point is that

when it comes to assessing the rationality of
actions, the four validity claims that are
constitutive of knowledge provide a necessary
but not a sufficient basis for claims to
rationality; for, as Habermas makes clear,
“rationality has less to do with the possession
of knowledge than with how speaking and
acting subjects acquire and use knowledge.”
(Habermas 1984, p. 8)
In his Theory of Communicative Action,
Habermas (1984, p. 279-286, esp. 285)
proposes a typology of action that can help us
deal with this requirement. The typology is
conceptually simple yet powerful. It provides a
framework that I have also found practically
relevant in my experience as a policy analyst
and evaluation researcher in government. It
captures fundamental differences in the
standards of rationality that actors pursue in
their attempts to be “rational.” What is more, it
also does justice to the concept of practical
reason introduced above. Building on previous
work by the sociologist Max Weber (1978),
Habermas suggests two basic dimensions for
classifying
actions
(see
Table
2).

Table 2: Types of action according to Habermas (1984, p. 285)
Action
orientation

Oriented to success

Oriented to reaching
understanding

Nonsocial

Instrumental action

————

Social

Strategic action

Communicative action

Action
situation

Depending on whether or not
interpersonal relationships matter, actions are
either “social“ or “nonsocial.” Habermas calls
this dimension the action situation; to some
extent it mirrors Weber’s concern about the
diminishing role of interpersonal coordination
of actions in the “social life-world” as
compared to the ever-increasing reach of
impersonal coordination according to merely
functional criteria of purposiveness and
bureaucracy. The defining feature of social

action situations is for Habermas that unlike in
nonsocial situations, rational action is
impossible without taking into account the
actions and views of other actors. This may
happen in different, more or less cooperative
ways; the second dimension of the typology
captures this issue.
Depending on whether or not actors
consider only their own interests or also those
of other persons, actions are either “oriented to
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success”
or
“oriented
to
reaching
understanding.” Habermas calls this second
dimension the action orientation; it reflects his
earlier well-known distinction of two
fundamental orientations of practice, to “work”
or to “interaction” (Habermas 1971).
Rationalizing these two aspects of practice
means different things. The rationalization of
“work” implies an expansion of technical
control so as to ensure success, whereas the
rationalization of “interaction” implies an
expansion of communicative means for
achieving mutual understanding. In the present
context, we can capture the step from a mere
success orientation to a concern for mutual
understanding by the simple formula: “from
calculation to communication.” This shift of
orientation is distinctive of rational action as
intended by practical reason.
At first glance, the intent of the two
dimensions seems to be almost the same.
However, when we cross tabulate them as
shown in Table 2, an important point becomes
apparent: recognizing the social nature of an
action situation is not the same as approaching
it with a cooperative orientation. It may
amount to merely strategic action, which the
typology reveals to represent an extension of
instrumental action to social situations rather
than the step from calculation to
communication
(communicative
action).
Habermas explains:
We call an action oriented to success
instrumental when we consider it under the
aspect of following technical rules of
action and assess the efficiency of an
intervention
into
a
complex
of
circumstances and events. We call an
action oriented to success strategic when
we consider it under the aspect of
following rules of rational choice and
assess the efficacy of influencing the
decisions of a rational opponent.
Instrumental actions can be connected with
and subordinated to social interactions
[…]; strategic actions are social actions by
themselves. By contrast, I shall speak of
communicative action whenever the
actions of the agents involved are
coordinated not through egocentric
calculations of success but through acts of
reaching understanding. (Habermas 1984,
p. 285f)
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Note that a teleological, purposeful
orientation is fundamental to all three concepts
of action. It would be a misunderstanding to
equate communicative action with action that
pursues no other purpose than communication
for its own sake. Communicative action
includes a cooperative orientation to mutual
understanding – this distinguishes it from the
two other concepts of action – but it does not
exclude
the
pursuit
of
purposes.
Communication is a means of coordinating
individual purposeful actions rather than the
end. The point of the classification is that
actors may pursue purposes in different ways,
dependent on their individual orientation as
well as the nature of the situation.
The discursive kernel of rational
action. The reader may miss in this typology a
fourth concept of action, discursive action.
However, it should be clear from our previous
discussion that discourse is a way of
examining the validity claims contained in any
of the three basic forms of purposeful action.
For this reason it is not advisable to conceive
of it as a separate fourth kind of action,
although this is what a few contributors have
suggested who have considered Habermas’
typology of action in the ISD literature thus
far. When the instrumental or strategic
rationality of a course of action is in doubt,
actors can switch to theoretical discourse;
when its communicative rationality is in
question, they can switch to practical
discourse. Conversely, when the legitimacy of
merely instrumental or strategic action as such
is contested, actors may subject it to a practical
discourse; and when the technical or economic
feasibility of some communicatively defined
action is in doubt, theoretical discourse may be
indicated. (Bear in mind that all action implies
both empirical and normative validity claims,
regardless of the orientation that effectively
guides the actors involved). The point thus is
simply that any kind of purposeful action
offers itself for discursive scrutiny. This is why
“discursive action” does not exist as a separate
category in Habermas’ typology.
Returning now to our staircase, the
same point applies: no single step but rather
the staircase as a whole embodies the
discursive principle. It makes sense, however,
to conceive of instrumental, strategic and
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communicative action as three ideal types of
rationality that come into play at the highest
three levels of the staircase and as such may
require discursive scrutiny in any concrete case
of IS design. We can understand the three
concepts of action as representing not only
three complementary dimensions of systems

rationalization but also a natural hierarchy in
which each level presupposes the previous
ones. Table 3 shows this three-level model of
rational systems practice, a model that I have
introduced in more detail elsewhere (Ulrich
1988).

Table 3: Three-level concept of rational systems practice (adapted from Ulrich 1988)
Dimension of
systems
rationalization

Core problem

Level of systems practice

Communicative

Management of conflict Normative systems
management
Social integration of
conflicting interests
Building up potentials of
mutual understanding
(interactive capabilities and
discursive chances)

“Critical”

Strategic

Management of
complexity
Effective steering of
complex systems

Strategic systems
management
Building up strategic
potentials of success
(steering capacities in view
of uncertainty and change)

“Soft”

Instrumental

Management of cost
Efficient allocation of
scarce resources

Operational systems
management
Building up potentials of
productivity (optimization)

“Hard”

The level of operational systems
management stands for a nonsocial,
instrumental concept of rationality. It is
concerned with the efficient use of means
rather than with developing interpersonal
relationships. Rationality at this level is
defined and measured in terms of means-end
rationality, that is, purposiveness (also called
purposive-rationality). We conceptualize it as
the lowest of the three levels because none of
the higher levels can fulfill its promise of
further rationalizing practice before the
problems of this lowest level are mastered.
The level of strategic systems
management stands for a social yet utilitarian
concept of rationality. Its orientation remains
purposive-rational even though interpersonal
relationships and intentions of other actors are

Tradition of
systems thinking

taken into account. Strategic management is
concerned with the complexity and uncertainty
that is characteristic of social action situations
in which third parties co-produce the system’s
success (or may threaten it). Under such
circumstances, the immediate orientation to
results that distinguishes the previous level
needs to be complemented by a longer-term
concern for securing “strategic potentials of
success,” that is, capabilities of self-regulation,
flexibility, and innovative adaptation in the
face of turbulent environments (Emery and
Trist 1965) and changing needs of all the
parties concerned.
The level of communicative systems
management, finally, stands for a social and
communicative concept of rationality. It is
concerned with the normative implications of
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purposive rationality as represented by both
instrumentally and strategically rational action.
In particular, it examines the ways in which
purposive-rational action may affect third
parties and how “rational” its rationality claims
may look from their perspective. What does it
mean to be rational when there is a genuine
conflict of rationalities, due to different needs
and interests, values and worldviews? Rather
than simply imposing its own rationality on
other parties and thereby treating them as mere
means for the pursuit of its own success,
systems rationalization at this level seeks to
achieve mutual understanding with respect to
the normative basis of rational action. It
overcomes the limitations of a merely strategic
handling of conflicts of interests by a concern
for normative acceptability and rationality in
the comprehensive sense intended by the
concept of practical reason.
Practical reason aims to expand the
reach of rationality from purposive-rationality
to the interactive dimension that is constitutive
of normative (evaluative) issues. To this end, it
strives to coordinate individual actions not
only based on interest positions alone but on
agreement concerning guiding standards of
value as well. Of course such agreement can
claim rationality only to the extent that it
withstands discursive challenge by all those
concerned; but the same limitation is basically
true of all other conditions of purposeful action
as conceptualized in the staircase.
The importance of this level of systems
rationalization is not merely that the interactive
dimension of rational practice is different but
first of all, that it exists and should not be
ignored. As we have seen in our brief
discussion of the concept of applied science,
this is by no means obvious. This highest step
in the staircase should remind us, in every
concrete case, that we may need to examine
carefully whether and in what ways we might
succumb to the earlier-mentioned confusion of
nontechnical rationality with nonrationality,
according to which “rational” is only what can
be explained in the terms of empirical-analytic
science. By implication practice would be
rational only to the extent that practical
decisions can be reduced to theoretical issues –
a conception of practical rationality that in
effect immunizes utilitarian rationality against
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the efforts of practical reason. I find it difficult
indeed to see why introducing a
complementary level of communicative
rationalization should imply a loss rather than
a gain of practical rationality; as soon as one
does not limit rationality a priori (merely by
definition) to technical rationality, this highest
level of our staircase becomes an indispensable
effort of critical reflection and discourse in the
quest for rational practice.

5

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION

Uncovering
the
hidden
argumentative structure of information
systems. We have now completed the
introduction of the philosophical staircase. As
I have attempted to make clear, its nine steps
all stand for considerations that are as vital
practically as they are philosophically
indispensable for ISD, and in fact for all
systems design. I have equally tried to make
clear that for each step, the discursive principle
is constitutive for justifying or questioning the
validity claims involved. Since each step
represents an additional level of systems
rationalization, it also implies additional
assumptions and corresponding claims that
need to be open to argumentative challenge,
which is what discourse is all about. This
suggests to me a first, basic interpretation of
our staircase:
The philosophical staircase embodies a
summary account of the relevance and
application of the discursive principle
to ISD.
By arranging the issues to which it
points in a theoretically based hierarchical
order, the staircase offers a systematic
(although iterative) way of proceeding. To the
extent it achieves its purpose it can guide IS
designers and users alike in reflecting upon,
and discussing, the concepts of “information,“
of “knowledge,” and of ”rational” action that
are, or ought to be, built into a system:
•

Steps 1-3 represent the philosophically
unavoidable assumptions and validity
claims
underpinning
a
specific
information system’s built-in concept of
information.
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•

Steps 4-6 represent the additional
assumptions and validity claims that come
into play if the information provided by
the specific system is to be considered as
representing a knowledge basis for
decision-making and action.

•

Steps 7-9, finally, represent the additional
assumptions and validity claims that need
to be addressed if such action is to be
conducive to rational practice.

An interesting implication is this. Since
discursive reality is never ideal, we can
understand the assumptions that flow into a
specific IS design as representing the break-off
points of discourses that have been terminated
implicitly or explicitly at some point of
reflection
by
those
involved.
Their
assumptions concerning the nine steps thus
represent the hidden argumentative structure of
the specific information system in question.
This conjecture yields a second interpretation
of the staircase:
The nine conceptual steps of the staircase
also embody the hidden argumentative
structure that in one way or another is
built into any information system.
As an example we may consider once
again a hospital information systems. Such
systems basically serve to control the huge
flow of data that is necessary for treating and
billing patients as well as for administrating
the diverse organizational units of a hospital.
More recently, the trend goes toward so-called
case-mix measurement. “Case mix” is a
hospital unit’s specific mix of patients with
regard to their treatments needs, that is, the
severity and complexity of their conditions.
The idea is that performance and cost
measurements cannot be meaningfully
compared among different organizational units
and used for improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of hospitals unless they are
standardized with respect to the changing case
mix of the units considered. The most widely
used system of case-mix measurement today is
Yale University’s “diagnosis-related groups”
(DRG) system (Fetter et al. 1980; for a
comprehensive hospital indicator system based
on
case-mix
and
service-population
measurement see Ulrich 1987b, 1990). In
many countries the financing arrangements for

hospitals now depend on such systems, that is,
case-mix measurement is linked to rewards
and sanctions that can be vital for the financial
viability and the development of hospitals. The
specific case-mix based indicator system used
thus represents an important (and complex)
part of the hidden argumentative structure of
these hospital information systems. The
question is, how well does this argumentative
structure reflect the medical needs of patients,
the quality and efficiency of the care they
receive, regional needs for the provision of
hospital services, the contribution of hospitals
to the training of doctors and nurses, and so
on? Who knows what is the “right”
argumentative structure? How can medical
staff and administrators act responsibly
without being in a position to question and
modify this argumentative structure? To what
extent, then, should the system be relied on as
a source of relevant information and valid
knowledge for rational action in hospitals,
given its power to sanction hospital units for
not acting according to its measurements?
Surely
it
would
make
sense
systematically to subject the information
provided by this kind of hospital IS to
institutionalized discursive procedures in
which all concerned parties participate in the
examination of case-mix measures and other
parts of the system’s argumentative structure
with regard to its semiotic clarity, the
empirical and normative validity of the
conclusions derived, and the rationality of
conforming action proposals. I assume that
some formal procedures of this kind exist in
most hospitals and financial authorities, but I
doubt whether those involved are all in a very
good position to assess the claims in question.
A good system might improve the situation by
offering methodical help in identifying and
judging the underpinning argumentative
structure. I am thinking, for example, of
interactive system capabilities that would
highlight the specific inference structure
underpinning any considered hospital indicator
and allow everyone involved making their own
“sensitivity tests” as to how results depend on
the structure (and of course also on the data).
The system might also offer relevant questions
for interpreting the result obtained, perhaps
even along the lines of our staircase. The aim
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would be to put all the parties concerned in a
position in which they can meaningfully
interpret the system’s informationIT and then
use
discursive
opportunities,
whether
institutionalized or informal ones, to support or
challenge proposals for actions in a competent
and responsible way. I cannot pursue the
example here any further, but I think it does
illustrate the suggested, twofold interpretation
of the philosophical staircase and thus also the
practical importance of the discursive
principle.
In Part 2, we will review the way in
which the discursive principle has been
considered thus far in the ISD literature.
Subsequently, I will outline my own discursive
approach to reflective practice in ISD.
(References: see Part 2)
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